Europe’s Options to Defend Itself

Luuk van Middelaar (LvM) In the current strategic context of the war in Ukraine and with Trump back in the White House, do you think Europeans must realize that now is the time to act with a view to the long term? Or do you fear panicky short-termism will take over, as in the past?

Claude-France Arnould (CFA) The time to act was long ago. The US has been telling us for a while to ‘be security providers, not security customers; we need to pivot towards Asia’. I've heard people from the Pentagon say bilaterally and even in public, ‘Be autonomous, be able to protect your security on your own; you have the wealth, you have the legitimacy, you have the responsibility.’ And that was during the Obama administration. 

LvM The Pentagon more than the White House?

CFA Yes, the Pentagon more, especially more than the State Department. The Pentagon gave the Europeans the signal in a friendly way at the time. Today, the signal is given more brutally, suggesting blackmail. Hence the risk that some governments will think that ‘to have peace with the Trump administration, let’s buy from the US’. Not just liquified natural gas, but armaments too.

“My biggest worry is that, even though we know that we need to act as Europeans, without the US or with just minimal American involvement, we still lack the means to do so.”

LvM Some member states might think of this as the only way to keep their protection at a time when they need it most. But what is your biggest concern today? And where do you see the most promising levers for action?

CFA My biggest worry is that, even though we know that we need to act as Europeans, without the US or with just minimal American involvement, we still lack the means to do so. This is about capacity in terms of ‘chain of command’, organization and governance, but also in terms of armaments.

LvM This notion of ‘chain of command’ has quite a military ring to it.

CFA There’s no way around it for a strategic actor. Since the 1950s, Europe has relied on NATO to take charge of our security. Its chain of command is simple. It's the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] who wears both an American and a NATO hat. So he or she has an American hat, drawing on US authority.

LvM Without any ambiguity or conflict of interest?

CFA Exactly. Since the emergence of the EU in the field of defence, the basic premise has been that it should do nothing that could harm the Alliance. We, therefore, relied on SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe—the headquarters of NATO's Allied Command Operations in Belgium] and on national headquarters—French, British, German, Italian and Greek—to be able to carry out an operation.

LvM Missions, for example?

CFA Yes, military operations. The awareness of that need resulted from the Yugoslavia experience. The shock of those wars and a humbling reliance on the US led to the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration [1998]. We were unable to keep the peace in our own neighbourhood. The British realized that the Americans didn't like that. There was a risk of US disengagement if Europe needed them to manage Serbia's behaviour in the region. The EU had to be capable of carrying out such operations autonomously. The details were set out in the Berlin Plus agreement, allowing Europeans to use SHAPE for missions within an EU framework.

LvM Do you then need the agreement of the North Atlantic Council? Not just from the US, but also agreement from the Turks and all the other allies?

CFA Indeed, and because of the constraints this implies, ‘Berlin Plus’ has only been used twice, in Northern Macedonia and Bosnia, for small-scale operations. For other operations, particularly in the 2000s, member states’ national headquarters were used for planning and conduct. For example, the first operation in Congo, in 2003, was led by the French. The second was led by the Germans. The 2008 anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia was led by the British. 

LvM You seem to be saying that without the Americans who hold a veto on the NATO Council—bearing in mind that the US Commander-in-Chief is the American President himself—there is some uncertainty as to whether the Europeans will be able to use SHAPE. In that case, we would find ourselves hapless, without the keys to a proper multinational command centre.

CFA Especially since there is no automatic military intervention under NATO. In the EU context, Article 42.7 [of the TEU] states that when a member state is under attack, the others are obliged to assist it ‘by all the means in their power’. This is much stronger than NATO’s Article 5, which leaves the choice of means open and therefore does not necessarily translate to military means. So, if an EU member state is attacked, we would find ourselves having to carry out a large-scale military operation as Europeans without the certainty of having the command resources at our disposal which we have relied on for decades. 

“Rather than making yet another grand declaration about the EU and NATO, we therefore need to ensure that as Europeans we can use SHAPE.”

LvM What kind of scenario are we talking about?

CFA If a member state is attacked, for example. Let’s say a Baltic state, or Poland, or Romania, or a state not yet in NATO, such as Ukraine, which hopes to join the EU as soon as possible. Of course, not all threats necessarily come from the east. In such scenarios, we find ourselves having to defend an EU member state with our own resources. Rather than making yet another grand declaration about the EU and NATO, we therefore need to ensure that as Europeans we can use SHAPE. The best case is for us to act in concert with allies, with the Americans, Canadians and Turks. But if that's not the case, can we use NATO’s command capabilities? I mean the human resources, secure communications systems, all the logistics needed to be able to plan and command an operation involving several European states—either as part of a ‘European pillar’ of NATO or within the EU.

LvM The President of the European Council, António Costa, has invited the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, to attend the EU leaders’ retreat on defence on 3 February. Should Costa raise this NATO issue?

CFA He should ask for clarity at least. Can we Europeans use SHAPE? Under what conditions? Perhaps arrangements can be made. If the answer is yes, then we’ll have some peace of mind about our ability to act. If the answer is no, we can speed up and establish capabilities to do what SHAPE does among ourselves, within the EU.

LvM What about the situation of and prospects for Europe’s defence industry? 

CFA In fact, our defence industry is powerful and solid. If you look at the export position of the main European arms producers, they are major players in the game. Especially now that Russia is keeping its production to itself, the French, Germans and Italians are among the world's leading exporters. It's not so much an overall weakness of the defence industry, but rather a long-term trend of focusing on worldwide exports, to the Middle East or Asia for instance, rather than on European markets. Not least because we don't have the equivalent of the ‘Buy American Act’. Europeans import their weapons from the US on a massive scale, a trend that has intensified since 2022. We were surprised by the shortage of ammunition and rapid equipment depletion, because of a failure to anticipate the recurrence of war in Europe. And let's not forget, still today, we are nowhere near an all-out ‘war economy’. But once again, this does not mean that the industry is intrinsically or globally weak. We need the right approach to respond to the legitimate question of immediate needs, whether for Ukraine or for stock replenishments. But we also need our industry to expand, and for that it needs outlets: medium- and long-term contracts and access to investment financing.

“For a long time, forgiveness simply meant buying American. After 9/11, it could also mean sending troops to Afghanistan.”

LvM Spending has increased since the Ukraine shock. Even if not all governments have caught up to the required two per cent of GDP, a consensus is growing in Europe that we should aim for three per cent. While on the eastern flank Poland and the Baltic States are spending over four per cent, most NATO members are obviously a far cry from the five per cent that Trump has called for. The will to do and spend more is there, but how can this political momentum be maintained over the longer term? It’s not enough for the defence establishments to change gear. Presidents and prime ministers need to convince their parliaments and public opinion of the need for this extra spending.

CFA I'm reminded of what a contact from the Pentagon once said to me when I asked him how to get political support for the defence industry. His answer was blunt: ‘Jobs in Seattle.’ Europe too needs jobs and the prosperity that comes with them. As for the numbers and defence spending percentages, they are often headlines and can also be a tactic and a means of exerting pressure. President Trump warns the Europeans: ‘If you don't do your 5%, I'll tell Putin that he shouldn't be shy about attacking you.’ He said that during the campaign. For a long time, NATO operated with defence planning targets that were so ambitious that few governments could achieve them. It was clear to all. You then ask for forgiveness. And for a long time, forgiveness simply meant buying American. After 9/11, it could also mean sending troops to Afghanistan. That's something to keep in mind when you hear about 5%. You have to be forgiven for not reaching it.

“If the EIB were to move away from its practice of keeping defence investments on the sidelines, it would send a strong signal to key financial players.”

LvM With Trump back in the White House and considering the early actions of his administration—I'm also thinking of Musk’s unrepentant meddling in the internal affairs of NATO allies like the UK and Germany—I think there's more public awareness now, a hunger for a greater freedom of action for ourselves. Would you agree?

CFA Yes, freedom of action, the need for non-dependence, for a significant degree of autonomy is recognized. Politically too. But the will has to be translated into investment and therefore into spending. For most EU member states, the joint deficit and debt rules form a constraint, not to mention the ‘debt brake’ some have imposed on themselves. So, we need to find ways of increasing public funding, at national and European levels, and attracting more private funding, a source from which the US military benefits greatly. European investors have certain reservations about defence. The EIB [European Investment Bank] too remains reticent. If the EIB were to move away from its practice of keeping defence investments on the sidelines, it would send a strong signal to key financial players.

LvM Is there a discussion ongoing with the EIB about making this happen? 

CFA It's not a statutory impossibility. All that’s needed is a decision by the Council, i.e. the representatives of the finance ministries. The idea is gaining ground, but too slowly. [A week after this interview took place, 19 EU heads of state or government wrote jointly to European Council President Costa, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (whose country holds the rotating Council presidency) and EIB President Nadia Calvino to recommend adjusting the Bank’s lending practice to the benefit of security and defence projects.] 

LvM On EU institutional matters, it strikes me that in current Brussels discussions, some people talk as if the EU is now ‘finally’ entering the field of defence, for instance with the arrival of a Commissioner for Defence. Obviously, even if originally the EU had no role in defence, the official ambition to play one appears already in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, while the European Defence Agency is more than twenty years old and—as you stated—there have been EU military missions for over two decades. When I worked for Costa’s predecessor Herman Van Rompuy, he chaired a European Council on defence in December 2013. That was the last summit dedicated to defence until that of 3 February. As we mentioned, Costa invited his 27 colleagues to an informal retreat, plus the British prime minister for dinner and NATO Secretary General Rutte for lunch. If you were President Costa’s advisor, what should he prioritize for EU action today?

CFA As I stressed before, first of all I would ask for clarification on Europe’s ability to carry out operations without the US, and therefore on the use (or not) of SHAPE. Secondly, there should be a roadmap for the defence industry, spurring the convergence of member states’ action, within an intergovernmental framework respecting their competences, and with the support of EU instruments. For that, you need proper mandates.

“Governments need to do the heavy lifting.  Any qualitative leap can only come from increasing these national budgets and optimizing their use.”

LvM How do you see the relationship between the mandates the European Council should grant to the Commission and to the European Defence Agency?

CFA The Commission has already made proposals, and negotiations are underway, on a regulation called EDIP [European Defence Industry Programme], which puts in place support measures for the defence industry between now and 2027. This regulation includes positive measures and involves €1.5 billion in EU funding over two years. But to get a sense of proportion: in 2023, member states jointly invested more than €70 billion in defence, out of their €279 billion total defence expenditure. Any qualitative leap can only come from increasing these national budgets and optimizing their use. Governments need to do the heavy lifting. They have the Defence Agency at their disposal to help them cooperate at every stage of a programme, from its research and inception to training and field operations, in any way they see fit. The Commission can provide concrete incentives such as EU budgetary support, VAT exemptions and ways of taking the defence perspective into account in all EU policies.

Hence the leaders need to ask the Commission and the Agency to put forward a series of proposals for joint action. This would enable heads of state and government at an upcoming European Council – in March or June 2025 – to commit to specific actions. To take two examples: the Commission has proposed setting up an EU equivalent to the US system of ‘Foreign Military Sales’ [by which the Department of Defense facilitates purchases by foreign governments from US industry]. Let's just put it together very quickly. Secondly, people are talking nonstop about aerial combat systems. Why not set up such programmes within an EU framework, especially if the VAT and other incentives I just mentioned are put in place and if it offers all the guarantees of flexibility and freedom for the participating states?

LvM There is a concept that is gaining ground, partly linked to what the EU does in competition law, which is that of the ‘common good’. In that conversation, the favourite example seems to be the ‘anti-missile shield’. Whether it is just to impress the public or whether it is serious, I find hard to judge. Apparently, it would cost €300 billion out of the €500 billion the EU is already having trouble collecting.

CFA I don't know either. In any case, we need to get things right, in the right order. We shouldn't be announcing budgetary envelopes that we then have to spend, at a time of austerity. The sequence should be for to Defence Ministers to issue a precise and technically motivated opinion on this, preferably more discreetly than on social media. It sounds obvious to say that we do not want to be hit by missiles and a shield would offer protection, but the real questions only then start. How should an anti-missile protection system be put together? What territory should it cover? What about the link with nuclear deterrence? Or with the project that Trump has just announced for the US? 

“We are so dependent on space that it would be irresponsible to risk losing access to it.”

LvM Not to forget the basic question: who decides when or whether to use it?

CFA Indeed, that’s crucial. I nevertheless believe in the value of having shared capabilities that could even be acquired by the EU, for example in the space domain, over and above the impressive programmes under way for space security and surveillance. Security in low Earth orbit is a critical issue, given all these constellations and the debris that is likely to spread even more, not to mention malicious acts. The French and Germans have invested in this field, and the Pentagon lends major support. But it would make sense, provided institutional sensitivities are kept in mind, to develop an EU system that improves our knowledge and ability to react in this field. We are so dependent on space that it would be irresponsible to risk losing access to it. 

LvM Commission President von der Leyen has asked two members of her team, the High Representative and the Defence Commissioner, Kaja Kallas and Andrius Kubilius, to develop a ‘defence union’. Do we have any idea what that might mean? Is this something you would recommend to the European Council president to propose to his colleagues on 3 February?

CFA As when the EU created the monetary union, in moving towards a defence union, a decision from the heads of state or government is indispensable. And we need to see what a defence union would actually mean. Defence is not just about armaments and its industrial base; it’s also about combat. In the current strategic emergency, is this really the moment to embark on the political and institutional journey towards such a defence union? The political problem of monetary union was solved by relying on an independent European Central Bank. However, we cannot conceive of an ‘independent’ European command, because in principle, and since ancient Greece and Rome, military command is under political authority. Which is to say, I would not recommend an institutional project but focus all energy on actual action. Action to strengthen our defences immediately. And as we discussed, this is about both military and industrial capabilities as well as, ultimately, means of planning and operational command. 

LvM Any final comment on the EU defence summit?

CFA Yes, I really appreciate the dinner invitation to the British prime minister. His presence calls for an in-depth exploration of EU-UK defence cooperation. Paradoxically, despite a reserved political stance and a freeze on the operating budget, the British have carried out actions that were extremely useful to the European Defence Agency. Together they could find new informal ways of cooperating as Europeans to defend our continent.