European leaders meet at the Paris Summit on Ukraine and Security in Europe on 17 February, 2025 | Copyright: European Union
- 19 Feb 2025
- Op-Ed
Europe’s voice at times of crisis – decrypting the Paris Summit
Vestert Borger and Luuk van Middelaar
He might not have ended the war between Ukraine and Russia within twenty-four hours, as promised during the election campaign, but twenty-four days into his presidency Donald Trump did announce that he and President Putin had agreed to ‘start negotiations immediately’. Blindsided by this U-turn in US foreign policy, leaders of Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark, as well as the European Council and Commission presidents and the Secretary General of NATO, met in Paris on Monday 17 February in an emergency summit to discuss the security of Ukraine and the European continent at large. The meeting followed a ‘Weimar+ Statement’ released on 12 February, which had stressed that ‘Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations’ and that a peace deal should guarantee ‘the interest of Ukraine and our own’. A second summit in Paris, with yet more participants, will take place later today [19 February].
Monday’s Paris Summit, attended by a mix of heads of government, EU chiefs and the NATO Secretary General, is a manifestation of the challenge that Europe faces in making its voice heard as its future hangs in the balance. This challenge is more profound than the need to adjust to a world in which liberal democracy is on the defensive. It touches on Europe’s constitutional foundations. Strongmen like Trump and Putin stand for a brand of personal power in the vein of the Hobbesian sovereign who wields authority as his nation’s representative. This clashes with the constitutional nature of Europe, and especially that of the EU. More than an international organization but less than a state, the Union’s existence is bound up with its plurality and the fact that there is no single ‘sovereign representative’ to speak on its behalf. If Europe is to secure a seat at the negotiating table and to have a voice in this era of strongman power, three issues require urgent attention.
First, who speaks on behalf of Europe? The desire for inclusivity must be balanced against the need for swift action. Just as national governments have formal committees or informal inner circles to deal with emergencies, Europe also requires a crisis response unit. The Paris Summit operated in this way, bringing together a select group of leaders. To make this work, it is essential that those not present do not feel sidelined. The composition of the summit indicated that some thought had gone into this aspect of the guest list. The presence of Prime Minister Tusk reflected not only Poland’s military strength and proximity to the conflict, but also Europe’s eastern dimension. Similarly, the Danish and Dutch prime ministers received an invitation in view of their relatively large contributions to Ukraine’s war effort. However, whereas Mette Frederiksen said that her attendance ensured that the interests of all Nordic states were represented, her counterpart Dick Schoof made no such reference to the Benelux countries – to the disappointment of Belgium and Luxembourg. Only when emergency summits get the guest list right can they claim to represent ‘Europe’. It is perhaps one reason among others that a follow-up summit, including more EU and NATO member state leaders, was felt necessary.
Second, what is the constitutional nature of such summits? They are not grounded in the EU Treaties or other legal instruments, nor do they produce binding decisions, which explains why European Council president Costa spoke prudently on social media about ‘consultations among Europeans’. But rather than a weakness, this should be interpreted as their strength. Ad hoc and improvised, emergency summits allow Europe to respond to events as they occur. Their set-up consequently varies depending on the exigency at hand. When Europe’s monetary union was on the brink of collapse in October 2011, German chancellor Merkel and French president Sarkozy met in Frankfurt with the heads of the European Council, Commission, Eurogroup and ECB. This ‘Frankfurt group’, created in the heat of the moment, formed the basis for important financial rescue interventions. Likewise, in the summer of 2023, Dutch and Italian prime ministers Rutte and Meloni together with Commission President Von der Leyen – ‘Team Europe’ as they called themselves – struck a deal with Tunisian president Saied to stem the flow of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean. Although such summits deviate from formal rules and practices, they can engender crucial incentives for action, provided that those who participate have sufficient political authority to enable subsequent decision-making by EU institutions and national capitals.
Third, what does it mean to represent Europe? The composition of the 17 February Paris Summit reflects the fact that when it comes to security and defence, the EU has limited means to act, even if it steps up its efforts in the years ahead. Member states do the heavy lifting. Fundamentally, the summit shows that the European Union is not equivalent to Europe. At stake in Russia’s war of aggression are not just the interests of Ukraine, nor of the EU alone, but those of the entire European continent. Should a peace deal be reached, it will radically alter the continent’s security architecture, in a way that both redraws and sharpens the geopolitical division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, ‘Europe’ and ‘Russia’. That is why the presence of the British prime minister and the NATO Secretary General were both essential.
As Europe scrambles to find a voice and to act at this moment of crisis, at the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics we will be analysing not just the substance of the decisions that are being made but also their constitutional form. Improvised configurations such as that in Paris should not be dismissed as mere set pieces of theatre; not only are they essential vehicles of political communication, signalling internally and externally that Europe is a democratic plurality, they also serve to mobilize Europe’s agency in the face of existential threats. It is safe to predict that we will see more of them – starting today, but also in the weeks and months ahead.
About the authors
Vestert Borger is incoming fellow for European constitutional politics at BIG. He is assistant professor for European law at Leiden University.
Luuk van Middelaar is the founding director of the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics.