Old ties, new relevance: Europe's colonial legacies and today’s geostrategic battles

Well beyond the EU’s external borders and scattered across the globe, overseas territories, protectorates and dependencies act as Europe’s strategic outposts. In an era of renewed great power rivalry, these distant regions are no longer peripheral concerns but increasingly critical frontline assets. Their location in geopolitical hotspots has made them key nodes for trade routes, maritime security and regional military presence.

Four geopolitical pressure points exist.¹ First, the South Pacific, where French New Caledonia – the fourth largest producer of nickel in the world – plays a pivotal role in EU–China relations. Second, the Indo-Pacific, where La Réunion, Mayotte and the French outermost regions host French military bases that play a role in maritime security. Third, global smuggling, drug and human trafficking routes from Latin America and Africa into Europe pass through Dutch, French, Portuguese and Spanish overseas territories. Finally, renewed geopolitical tension over the Arctic has focused international attention on Greenland.

In the last decade, some European states have begun to act on the geopolitical potential of their territories. In 2024, Portugal announced proposals for new bases on Madeira and the Azores to bolster national defence in the region and counteract threats from the Gulf of Guinea and South and Central America. Prime Minister François Bayrou has also identified French overseas territories as a priority for his government. France appears to be relying increasingly on them to bolster its global status, yet faces growing questions of legitimacy, financial constraints and persistent accusations of neocolonialism due to its approach.²

The UK offers a snapshot of the challenges posed by the post-colonial relationships at stake for Europe. After an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in 2017 and a judgement from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2021, the UK has agreed to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius through a deal that would secure it a 99-year lease on the islands. The lease would enable the continued operation of the US military base on Diego Garcia. Controversy has arisen in the UK over the cost to the taxpayer for the lease and from its declaration that Chagossians, who were removed from the Archipelago in the 1960s and 1970s to build the US base, will not be able to return to the islands because of political and logistical challenges.

Within the EU, there are currently thirteen Overseas Countries and Territories (including Aruba, Curaçao, French Polynesia and Greenland), nine Outermost Regions (like Guadeloupe, the Canary Islands and La Réunion) and six Special Status Cities (such as Spain’s Ceuta and Melilla). These are mostly remnants of Europe’s imperial past. Each category indicates the type of relationship it currently has with its member state and consequently with the European Union, being either inside or outside EU territory and the internal market.³

The colonial origin of these arrangements is frequently downplayed within the EU, but that was not always the case. For about fifteen years after the Second World War, as colonial powers lost significant influence in Asia – with the independence of India and Indonesia and trouble in Indochina – some European states attempted closer ties with their African colonies. This objective was turned into a shared European mission as of the 1950 Schuman Declaration and reflected in the set-up of the 1958 European Economic Community.⁴ However, the Community’s explicit colonial dimension rapidly disappeared from the European narrative with the decolonization wave of the early 1960s.

Today, EU engagement with its overseas regions and territories is embedded in Article 198 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,⁵ which defines their association primarily in terms of fostering economic and social development and establishing close economic ties with the EU. The main form of geostrategic engagement with the overseas territories has been related to their involvement in regional organizations.⁶ Tellingly, despite their current and potential importance for security, there is little to no mention of these territories in the EU’s latest strategic documents.⁷ An omission that requires redress.

Today, as geographic reach is ever more critical to global strategy, the EU cannot credibly pursue its own 'open strategic autonomy' without fully integrating these territories into its strategic vision. As Richard Werly recently argued, for this reason their future should be debated at the EU level.⁸ In these geopolitical times, countries must juggle the need for strategic advantage and the risk of being seen as opportunistic neo-colonialists.