Wang Dan: ‘China’s goal is to reshape the world in its image’

Wang Dan, a leading figure in the student-led democracy movement of 1989, was nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize and was China’s ‘Most Wanted’ student leader after the military crackdown. He was sentenced in 1991 to four years in prison, released in 1993, then re-arrested. In 1996, he was sentenced to eleven years in prison for ‘conspiring to overthrow the government’. He was held until April 1998, when, during the US–China diplomatic talks ahead of President Clinton’s visit to Beijing, he was released on medical grounds. He was immediately flown to the United States, where he has remained in political exile, completing a PhD at Harvard University. Wang currently serves as director of the Dialogue China think tank and as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

LvM: Could you briefly describe where you were, both in relation to the events in Europe and the demonstrations in Beijing?

WD: Yes, in 1989 I was a college student. Like thousands of other students and citizens, I took to the streets to appeal to the government for freedom of speech and democracy. That movement lasted around fifty days, before the government sent troops who opened fire on us, resulting in what is now known as the Tiananmen Massacre.

I want to clarify something: there’s often confusion about what exactly happened. People usually refer to it simply as the ‘’89 Incident’. But I believe there were actually two distinct events: first, the 1989 Democratic Movement, led by students demanding reform; and second, the June 4th Massacre, which was the government’s violent crackdown. These are related but fundamentally different phenomena.

LvM: Let’s begin with that first phase, the fifty days of protest and hope. What were your goals at the time? What did you think was achievable in terms of reform or democracy in China?

RK: And were you at all aware of the movements happening in Europe at the same time?

WD: I was just a freshman in 1989. Honestly, we knew very little about what was happening in Europe. We had vague notions of events in Czechoslovakia or Poland. We were perhaps more aware of protests in Thailand and other parts of Asia.

Our demands back then were largely idealistic. We didn’t have many concrete political or institutional goals. One specific demand was to lift press censorship, but most of our ideas revolved around general principles like democracy, equality and human rights.

Looking back, I think that’s because we didn’t imagine that we would carry out reforms ourselves. We believed it was the government’s responsibility to act. Our hope was that by putting pressure on the authorities, especially reform-minded leaders like Zhao Ziyang, we would get them to implement political changes. But we didn’t have a clear idea of what those changes should be.

RK: In retrospect, do you see that as a mistake? Could you have thought through your demands more thoroughly? Could your generation have taken on more responsibility?

WD: Yes, I believe we misunderstood a few key things.

First, our concept of democracy was overly simplistic. We thought democracy just meant checks and balances, or freedom of speech, things we associated with the West. But now I understand that democracy is more than a political system; it’s a way of life.

Second, we placed too much hope in the government. We believed it would act if we simply applied pressure. But democracy also requires active participation from citizens. At the time, we naively thought it was enough to urge the government to act. Now I see that the government is a ‘necessary evil’; it won’t reform unless there is sustained pressure from the people. We didn’t fully grasp that then.

LvM: There’s been debate about whether it was an intellectual or a popular movement. You were charged with ‘counter-revolutionary propaganda’, partly for your ties to intellectuals. But that’s not how you view the movement, is it?

WD: Looking back, the movement had two distinct phases. The first, from 15 April to 13 May, was a student movement. But after we began the hunger strike on 13 May, it evolved into a broader democratic movement involving people from many walks of life.

As students, we were prepared to organize a campus-based protest. We aimed to speak on behalf of the people. But once it became a nationwide movement, we were no longer equipped…

RK: The way you describe it, it sounds like you think the outcome wasn’t inevitable, that things could have gone differently.

WD: Yes, initially, we didn’t see the government as an enemy. We simply wanted to express our views. But after 13 May, once the hunger strike began, the government began to see us as a threat, and the conflict escalated.

LvM: Were you inspired by earlier Chinese student movements, like those in the early twentieth century or the 1960s? Or by what you mentioned earlier, the movement in Thailand?

WD: Many assume we were inspired by Western values. That’s not true. In 1989, we saw ourselves as part of a Chinese tradition. In our culture, intellectuals have a responsibility to speak out for the country. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 was our real reference point, not events in the West. We felt we were the last generation of that movement, continuing that legacy. It was a continuation of that Chinese heritage, not a borrowing from the West. That is a common misunderstanding.

RK: You still seem to express hope for democracy in China. Do you still feel that way today?

WD: I do. Democracy and human rights are rooted in human nature. It doesn’t matter whether you’re from China, Europe, or the US, we’re all human beings. So I believe the Chinese people also want democracy because it improves their lives. The real obstacle is the dictatorship. The government suppresses the will of the people.

But I still have hope. It might take a long time, maybe one or two generations, but I have patience. I’ll do what I can and wait.

RK: There have been rumours about Xi Jinping’s weakening grip on power. Do you think there’s any truth to that?

WD: I think those are just rumours. Xi has been traveling abroad, which signals that he still holds power. His image is everywhere in state media. There might be internal power struggles, but they’re likely among his loyalists, people jockeying for higher positions, not between Xi and real opponents.

LvM: Looking back at 1989 again, while the protest movement may not have been inspired by events in Europe, could the government’s harsh response have been shaped by fears of what happened to Gorbachev? Deng Xiaoping seemed determined not to repeat the Soviet leader’s path.

WD: I don’t think Gorbachev’s visit was a major influence on the leadership’s response. We knew the Soviet Union was undergoing reform, but we were focused on our own domestic issues. Of course, we hoped Gorbachev’s visit might influence Deng Xiaoping, but we weren’t very optimistic.

What was significant, though, was the global media presence during Gorbachev’s visit. Thousands of foreign journalists were in Beijing. They broadcast the events live to the world, and that inspired us. I remember thinking: ‘We’re writing history, and the whole world is watching.’ That gave us strength.

But what surprised me was how quickly Western governments tolerated the Chinese crackdown. We had hoped for more support. Yet within months, the US sent a special envoy to Beijing to show goodwill. Most sanctions disappeared within two years. That was deeply disappointing. They told Deng, ‘We still want to maintain the friendship between the United States and China’. I think that sent a message to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that they could do whatever they wanted without consequences. That international response allowed China to go down a different path. What I mean is, today’s CCP is a monster raised by the international community. This leaves me with very complex feelings.

RK: Do you think that was the moment when the West abandoned ideology in favour of economic interests?

WD: Yes, I do. I think the West has misunderstood the nature of the CCP for a very long time. Over the past fifty years, since Deng Xiaoping came to power, the West has held onto two big myths. First, that economic growth will eventually lead to demands for democracy from the middle class. Second, that there are liberal leaders within the CCP.

Now I think both beliefs are just myths. When it comes to economic issues, yes, CCP leaders may appear ‘liberal’ because they want to make money. But politically, there are no liberal leaders, they are all conservative. They all want to maintain control.

That’s the first misunderstanding. The second is about China’s middle class. Western countries assume that, like in their own histories, a wealthier middle class will demand democracy and rights. But that hasn’t happened in China.

In China, during the economic boom, the middle class entered into what I call an ‘unspoken contract’ with the government: they support the CCP, and the CCP provides them with economic benefits. They work hand in hand to make China ‘great’ again. So how can anyone place hope in China’s middle class? It’s completely different from the Western idea of a middle class. That’s the biggest misconception about China, in my view.

LvM: Then what group or social category do you place your hope in, for the kind of change you want to see?

WD: I put my hope in civil society. Only a strong civil society can lead to democracy. But since Xi Jinping came to power, he has done everything possible to suppress civil society. We are now going backward, toward something like the Cultural Revolution…

But so to say, even in Europe, economic interests come before values. That’s not what I expected. I hoped Europe would put principles above money, but unfortunately, many have given up.

RK: One of the ideas we’re exploring in this project is whether a different path was possible. If Europe had taken a more independent stance in the 1990s, maybe there could have been better relations with both Russia and China. Do you think that’s realistic or just wishful thinking?

WD: Honestly, I think that’s naïve. Even now, many Europeans want peace with China. But we already know Xi Jinping’s ambitions. He wants to be a global leader and expand CCP influence across the world. There’s no room for peace or friendship. China’s goal is to reshape the world in its image.

This is like a new Cold War, not necessarily a hot war, but a war of ideology. You can’t try to be friends with both sides. You have to choose. I know Europeans are unhappy with the US sometimes, but when it comes to China, there’s no middle ground. At least the US and Europe share some core values and follow international rules.

But China? They promise to follow rules, but they never do; look at their behaviour with the WTO. How can you be friends with a government that constantly lies? Europe has to make a choice.

LvM: That idea, that we’re entering a new Cold War, also connects to 1989. From the Western perspective, the Cold War ended in 1989 or 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. But from your perspective, were the seeds of Cold War 2.0 already sown in 1989 with the Tiananmen crackdown?

WD: Yes, definitely. What happened in Beijing in 1989 was in many ways a result of the original Cold War. There was a global movement toward democracy, in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, even in Thailand. That influenced many Chinese people and gave them the courage to demand democracy.

On the one hand, it continued the tradition of Chinese intellectuals from movements like May Fourth. On the other hand, it was fuelled by Cold War dynamics.

So even if Cold War 1.0 had some downsides, it still led to democratic change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and inspired Chinese citizens.

As we face Cold War 2.0, we don’t need to copy the past, but we can learn from it. For example, sending a clear signal: we want a democratic China. If China democratizes, we can be friends. But if it stays authoritarian, we are ideological opponents, not just competitors but adversaries.

Western countries don’t need to interfere directly, but they should encourage Chinese people to fight for their own future, and show clear support.

LvM: But the current US president, Donald Trump, sends a very different message to the world.

WD: Yes, I know. Trump doesn’t care about human rights or political values, only about economics. … I still believe in the democratic system of the US, and that future leaders will take these responsibilities more seriously. Every four years, the US has a new president.

RK: What you say is sobering but also inspiring. It gives Europe a chance to recover self-respect, if we started thinking about China and Russia the way you describe, we could take a different path.

WD: I’m honestly tired of talking to European governments. I don’t think they’re very useful. But I still have some hope.

RK: That hope could lie in the people, in civil society?

WD: Exactly. European civil society is strong: journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders. I hope they can push their governments to do more. I can’t do that. Only European civil society can. That’s why I put my hope in people like you.

LvM: We’re working on these issues. About your think tank, which has done work in Europe, including in Czechia and Germany, is it still active? Or are you focusing your energy elsewhere?

WD: Two years ago, I led a team to visit European countries. We spoke with the German Parliament and even the Czech president. … I’ve made my views clear. What they do with it is up to them.

But we want to continue those efforts. I also hope to establish a regular dialogue, not between me and the Chinese government, but between Chinese civil society and the international community. That’s why I accepted this interview: to express that message. We are ready for dialogue, civil society to civil society. ... The only force that can truly change China is the Chinese people. Those are the two forces I believe in: new Chinese immigrants and the young generation. I believe they will be key to changing China.