Dire Straits: European (dis)unity and the Iran war

Yet again, Europeans are being criticized or, more precisely, are blaming themselves, for not acting as a united and decisive force in the conflict triggered by the Israeli and American strikes against Iran and by the regime’s region-wide retaliatory attacks.

No European government was consulted by Trump and Netanyahu in advance of their military intervention. Now Europeans face the consequences of decisions that were unilateral and, at least on the American side, unclear in their objectives. The disastrous humanitarian, strategic and economic effects are impacting not only Europe and the entire Middle East region but also Asia and more or less all other continents. Further severe consequences should be anticipated globally.

There was no discussion at the UN about garnering a legal basis for the military action, as there was in 2003 when ‘old Europe’ opposed the so-called ‘new’ Europe. There was therefore no occasion for divergent positions in the UN Security Council to be aired, or for unity through a vote. There was no advance request for military involvement from the belligerents, with the important exception of the use of certain European military bases. On this issue, admittedly, responses diverged and even – notably in the case of the UK – evolved under increased bilateral pressure. Now, suddenly, the US president demands wider participation for opening up the Strait of Hormuz and again threatens NATO allies, in vague but ominous words, saying that if he does not get what he wants, ‘it will be very bad for the future of NATO’.

So far, the limits of solidarity have lain more in nuances of expression and behaviour than in differing views. To be fair, commenting on the appalling situation is complex: the rule of law and the international order are being violated by Tel Aviv and Washington, yet the Iranian regime is both dangerous and cruelly repressive. According to personal, political or historical factors, some European heads of state or government have emphasized the violation of international law, while others have chosen to stress – despite the questionable legality – a form of moral legitimacy for the action. In fact, the differences are not only between European states but also within them, even within governing coalitions.

Nevertheless, these nuances, regrettable though they may be, largely concern declarations, a European rhetorical speciality which is not necessarily influential or useful. While some Europeans – in particular the President of the Commission – frantically tweeted or made speeches, the media were not flooded with statements from Beijing. Yet nobody doubts China’s importance or the interests it has at stake. The European objective should therefore be less about coordinating words, or even interpreting the body language in the Oval Office, and more about implementing common actions when relevant and effective at the EU level, with each actor playing its role and exercising its responsibilities.

A foreign policy in common, not a single EU policy

The common conflation of the EU with European countries inevitably creates misperceptions about European policies and actions.

Regarding foreign policy, security and defence, EU members are committed to a common policy, not to a single policy, unlike the Monetary Union. This distinction is far from a technicality. In the 1990s a heated debate raged between supporters of a common currency and advocates of a single currency. The bold decision was to implement a Monetary Union with a single currency, the euro replacing national currencies such as the Deutschmark, the franc and the lira.

The political choice regarding foreign and security policy has been quite different. Member states retain their national sovereignty and competence. For instance, whereas France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power, other states have developed strong regional cooperation and may sign bilateral treaties within the EU or outside it. History and geography are essential factors in foreign policy. In the Middle East, nobody would expect Germany to behave in the same way towards Israel as Spain or France might, or France to forget its links with Lebanon, or certain neighbours – who see the American umbrella as vital reassurance – to risk ‘unnecessarily’ infuriating their main ally. The diversity of sensibilities is to be expected, as it is within a nation or any community. Indeed, this diversity is more positive than it is detrimental; the opposite could even be dangerous.

What matters is action rather than words. An essential part of diplomacy and defence remains a national responsibility. For example, France has signed defence agreements with the United Arab Emirates and must respect these commitments. France did not seek an EU endorsement, it did not need one, but this also means that the other member states are not bound by such bilateral agreements.

In contrast, protecting Cyprus is a commitment for all EU member states should Cyprus invoke the mutual defence clause in Article 42.7 of the Treaty. The decisions taken by Greece, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany – as well as the UK, whose Akrotiri military base in Cyprus was targeted – to deploy naval forces operationalize European solidarity, even though the clause was not formally invoked.

For the EU to be consistent and effective, the division of roles and responsibilities must be respected. The EU does not have exclusive competence in foreign and security policy, but it should be used when member states share an interest in acting together and in employing the Union’s instruments.

Rivalry and overreach

Two deviations are unacceptable. The first is systematic opposition and blackmail, as practised by Hungary. Although Hungary cannot be compelled to comply with EU decisions when unanimity is required, it can be excluded from the benefits of EU policies, either through the use of Article 7 of the Treaty or through a wider recourse to variable geometry.

Equally unacceptable is the growing rivalry between institutions and the individuals who lead them. While nuances among member states are natural – even legitimate – turf battles between institutions undermine Europe’s credibility and agency. The President of the European Commission, by systematically overstepping her role, exacerbates these tensions. With respect to the Iran war, she has yet again been strongly criticized for diplomatic overreach. Contact with heads of state in the Gulf region, while war rages, was not within her remit. Her public stance on the American and Israeli strikes did not reflect any European consensus.

She persistently positions herself as the EU’s representative abroad, whereas this role falls to the President of the European Council. António Costa, who has impeccable manners, would certainly not have instigated an incident such as ‘Sofagate’ – when Mrs von der Leyen was left without a proper seat during a meeting with President Erdoğan. Nevertheless, he had to stress the importance of the rule of law and solidarity between member states in a balanced and consensual speech on 10 March to the Ambassadors’ Conference in Brussels.

The present crisis is another episode in which Ursula von der Leyen has exceeded her powers by committing the European Union on fundamental issues without any prior decision by the Council or the European Council. For instance, she promised swift EU accession to Kyiv in the very first weeks of the Russian aggression. She instructed the High Representative/Vice-President Kallas to coordinate work on building a ‘true European Defence Union’ and asked Commissioner Kubilius to work closely with her towards the same objective, even though neither the European Council nor the Lisbon Treaty establishes such a ‘European Defence Union’. She also sent Commissioner Dubravka Šuica as an observer to the meeting of President Trump’s Board of Peace, despite the absence of any consensus on the initiative. This list is far from exhaustive.

At the same time, she is not fully discharging the responsibilities incumbent upon the Commission. The current crisis highlights Von der Leyen’s reluctance to take measures that do fall within her remit, particularly regarding trade issues or the protection of member states from economic pressure. In EU policies such as trade, the Commission has the monopoly of initiative, although decisions must subsequently be taken by the Council and the Parliament.

Today, when Spain is facing the threat of an embargo because its prime minister refused the US access to its military bases and called for respect for international law, the Commission has not reacted. Nor did it consider triggering the Anti-Coercion Instrument when member states that had supported Greenland were threatened by Trump with tariff retaliation. Similarly, no protective measure has been adopted to shield judges of the International Criminal Court or former Commissioner Thierry Breton from US sanctions, whether through the Anti-Coercion Instrument or the EU Blocking Statute, which was designed precisely to protect individuals or companies from extraterritorial measures. Addressing Europe’s vulnerability to American dominance in financial transactions would also be a promising avenue for the Commission to explore.

Furthermore, the situation in the Middle East urgently requires consideration of the full range of the war’s economic consequences, notably regarding energy security and wider security of supply. The Commission has a major role to play in these matters.

The rivalry between the President of the Commission and the High Representative is another factor contributing to the cacophony. This thorny issue is rooted in the ‘double hatting’ of the High Representative, who is both Vice President of the Commission and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. Member states consider that, as High Representative, Kaja Kallas represents them. The President of the Commission, by contrast, regards Kallas as part of the Commission and therefore under her authority.

The Critical Role of the High Rep

To make the role even more complex, the High Representative also heads the European Defence Agency and chairs its steering board, composed of the 27 defence ministers. The competition between Von der Leyen and Kallas often revolves around visibility. In terms of action, however, the High Representative could play a significant role if allowed to do so and unchallenged by the Commission. The EU is already conducting two naval operations in the Middle East: Operation Aspides, which aims to secure maritime traffic in the Red Sea – particularly against Houthi attacks – and Operation Atalanta in the Indian Ocean, initially launched against piracy. Their mandates and duration have recently been extended. They should benefit from the political leadership of the High Representative to ensure their robustness through sustained commitment by member states, to rationalize their chain of command, and to provide visibility for the missions. Considering Trump’s demand for a European contribution to security in the Strait of Hormuz, no time should have been lost in demonstrating that European action was already underway. Difficult moments may lie ahead, such as initiatives from the Secretary General to launch a NATO operation, which would be ‘complementary’ and then offer an exit strategy in a chaotic situation, with a transfer of responsibility reminiscent of events in Afghanistan. The consideration of future support for Lebanese governmental forces, once the Israeli military action against Hezbollah is over, will also require her political guidance.

The High Representative has intelligence assets under her authority that support the member states and EU policies during crises: the Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and the Satellite Centre in Torrejón, which provides space-based imagery analysis. She can also help facilitate the safe return of European citizens from the region. She will play an important role within the crisis coordination mechanism led by the Council – and the rotating Presidency – to address complex crises and prepare for further developments arising from the war.

Admittedly, the division of responsibilities within the EU is complex, and member states retain sovereignty in foreign policy and defence. Interesting proposals such as a European ‘security council’ are being debated – either a body like a national security council that supports the of heads state and government or a restricted format inspired by the UN Security Council – that might improve coordinated responses to strategic issues.

What is already possible, however, is respect for national responsibilities and the diversity of their sensibilities while focusing – as far as the EU is concerned – on action. Each institution or structure should adhere to and fully enact its role and existing capabilities.